5.1 Advanced Preparations and Planning

Activate Emergency Operation Centers Quickly – “Minutes after the Northridge earthquake, the City and County of Los Angeles was able to activate its Emergency Operations Center and begin emergency response procedures. This center was built in response to the events associated with the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In addition, the numerous state and local transportation and safety agencies within the region had coordinated on safely moving large numbers of people on the transportation network for numerous large-scale events like the 1984 Olympics, political conventions and special sporting and entertainment events.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: Cross-Cutting Study
Assess Damage Quickly – “The earthquake in the Los Angeles region created damage over a 2,100-square-mile area. Transportation officials had to quickly assess damage to the system and prioritize where to immediately place its resources. The California Department of Transportation immediately mobilized technical experts among its staff of 23,000 workers spread across the state to descend upon the Los Angeles region to begin the response and recovery efforts. By the late morning of the first day, engineers were assigned the task of evaluating the structural integrity of the portions of the system and setting up temporary detours. To expedite the clean up process, California Department of Transportation officials in the field were able to quickly enter into ‘handshake agreements’ with private contractors to begin demolition and debris removal within 16 hours of the earthquake. This initial day-1 response occurred on a state holiday, Martin Luther King Day.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: Cross-Cutting Study
“Consider the Emergency Needs of Both People and Equipment – During an emergency, people will need drinking water, food, portable toilets, flashlights, and battery-powered radios.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region
“Consider the Movement of Pedestrians As Well As Vehicles – During the September 11th attack and the blackout, severe traffic congestion was caused by numerous employees leaving work within a short period of time and the conflict between both pedestrians and vehicles wanting to use the same river crossings. It was noted that people walking through tunnels and across bridges could prevent emergency vehicles from entering an event’s location.

Therefore, some agency representatives discussed the need to plan for the flow of pedestrians. They stressed the need to identify and publicize transportation hubs—locations where people can assemble and from where they could take public transportation buses out of the city.

During the blackout, staff at the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Bridges and Tunnels worked with staff from the New York City Transit Buses to transport pedestrians across the bridges and tunnels. Bridges and Tunnels staff marshaled pedestrians into staging areas, mainly near the entrances to a few tunnels and bridges. New York City Transit Buses supervisors sent buses to these locations to transport these people across the facility. They foresaw using a public address system in future emergencies to inform pedestrians of locations to catch transportation out of the city.

Representatives from other New York City agencies also discussed controlling the conflict between pedestrians and vehicles. They proposed developing a plan that would identify streets to be used only by people on foot and would assign staff or citizens at major intersections along these streets to control traffic. The plan would also identify which bridges would be designated for pedestrians usage and which for vehicle usage.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout
“Coordinate Evacuation Routes across Jurisdictional Boundaries – Examine and modify evacuation route designs if necessary to accommodate evacuation management strategies. For example, reversible lane operations and the use of shoulders as an additional lane might require modifications to interchange designs.”
Disaster Response and Evacuation User Service: An Addendum to the ITS Program Plan
Coordinate the Reentry of Residents with Hazard Mitigation and Restoration of Services – “Introducing residents into previously evacuated areas was an issue that most respondents indicated was not adequately addressed even with planning. As a result, there was congestion and confusion as firefighters were maneuvering around residents, utilities, insurance people, and so on. Respondents felt it was important for unified command to coordinate the sequence of hazard mitigation and the restoration of services with the return of residents. They recommended involving utilities and public works departments before allowing residents to return to their homes.”
Southern California Firestorm 2003: Report for the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
“Do Not Ignore Low-Tech Solutions – Agency representatives used a combination of facsimile machines, pagers, 800 numbers and conference call lines, older radio systems, and previously installed dedicated landlines to communicate within and among agencies.

Staff at INformation FOR Motorists (INFORM) noted that resetting traffic signal controllers with a limited staff was difficult. After assessing their actions during the blackout, they have grouped intersections according to their snow-plowing routes. They will be making laminated sheets of the routes to guide technicians as they check and reset the traffic signal controllers. Police assigned to the Traffic Control Division used scooters to convey messages to officers in the field when their communication was temporarily disrupted.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout
“Do Not Neglect the Small Items – Several mentioned the need to stock food, such as high-energy food bars, and water for staff that have to operate emergency operations centers over an extended period of time. Others highlighted having additional flashlights and lanterns and charged batteries for cell phones, pagers, portable radios, and portable computers. One interviewee stressed having a portable AM/FM radio and batteries in order to receive information from the media.

The plan for one agency outlined procedures to follow if its central facility had to be evacuated, one of which called for forwarding phone calls to the agency to another location. Unfortunately, the facility had to be evacuated. Staff then realized that forwarding calls was not an automated process and the telephone carrier had to be contacted. Because of difficulty with the phone service, the provider could not be reached.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout
“Insulate Emergency Response Capacities from Disruption and Compromise – Emergency telecommunications systems must have redundancy built in, and emergency transportation procedures must provide for sufficient stores of fuel.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout Great Lakes Region
“Learn From Past Events – Staff at New York City Transit noted that employees were guided by the experience they gained from the blackouts in 1965 and 1977. Many identified their need for backup power sources. Staffs at INFORM and at the Niagara International Transportation Technology Coalition identified several key intersections where generators would be installed to operate the traffic signals. INFORM staff also identified key fueling facilities, and installed generators at those locations.

The Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee staff noted that while preparing for Y2K they developed strong working relationships with staff from the various emergency operations centers located in New York and New Jersey.

Furthermore, New Jersey Transit staff noted that they gained experience during the Centennial Celebration and Op Sail 2000. During these events, participants had to be moved from a single location, such as Liberty Park, to various destinations in eastern New Jersey. This movement was similar to what occurred during the blackout—transporting commuters from a single location, such as the New Jersey ferry docks and the Port Authority bus terminal, to surrounding communities.

In response to the events of September 11, staff at INFORM developed emergency management procedures in conjunction with their New York State Department of Transportation headquarters in Albany with some assistance by the FHWA and the Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee staffs. Staff at the Port Authority noted that after September 11, they installed a backup generator at the location of their emergency operations center, and it performed as expected.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout
“Periodically Reevaluate the Need for Backup Power and Generators – Most agencies had some degree of backup power during the blackout. In some cases, the backup power was adequate; in others, it was not. Representatives of some agencies were surprised by what was not covered by their backup systems. Two agencies lost power for the card-key systems that governed access to their offices. Some agencies had backup power for their computers but none for the air conditioning units needed to cool the equipment. Agencies that had newer central telephone systems experienced more problems than agencies with older systems.

Some agencies had backup power for only a portion of their fueling facilities. Some had backup for the fuel pumps but not for lighting at the facility. One agency recently converted to electronic fuel dispensing stations. After losing and then regaining power, some of the computers that ran the stations had to be manually restarted.

Some interviewees noted that they had backup power, but it had not been tested under a full load, and did not operate as expected.”
Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: August 2003 Northeast Blackout

February 7, 2006
Publication #FHWA–HOP-08-015